Although there is no Sanskrit or Pali word that corresponds directly to the modern American idea of "emotion," the narrative literature of early Indian Buddhism proposes that one can be controlled by one's mental states and that mental states, once arisen, can generate action. This belief is also widespread in later Buddhist literature. 1 In The Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhicaryävatära) y from perhaps the seventh century, Säntideva explains that mental states may easily arise, take control of us, and lead us to misdeeds:
Just as pain arises though it is not desired, anger arises forcibly though it is not desired. A person does not just become angry upon thinking, "I shall get angry," nor does anger arise upon thinking intentionally, "I shall arise." All offenses and various vices arise through the influence of conditions. They do not arise independently. 2 While a mental state, once generated, may result in antisocial behavior, it may also result in a meritorious deed. In what follows, I explore an example of this latter process that occurs in the Divyävadäna {Divine Legends)-a compilation of Buddhist narratives from the early centuries of the Common Era written in Sanskrit. In the Divyävadäna frequent mention is made of the mental state oí prasäda-a term with a complex semantic range that has frequently, though not unproblematically, been translated as "faith," "graciousness," and "serene joy." Unlike the emotions that Lutz's informants describe, the arousal oí prasäda is not a result of being weak or irrational but, rather, a product of the overriding power that certain external objects exert on individuals. Further, the ac-tion engendered by prasäda is not a misdeed, an offense, or a vice but a meritorious act that yields tremendous karmic results.
THE MECHANICS OF PRASÄDA
Prasäda occurs most frequently in the Divyävadäna in the following kind of scenario: a being sees the Buddha, prasäda arises in him or her, and the being makes an offering to the Buddha. The Buddha then foretells the reward that the donor will accrue as a result of his or her gift. This scenario can be seen, for example, at the beginning of two consecutive stories in the text-The Story of a Brahman 's Daughter (Brähmanadärikä-avadäna) and The Story of a Brahman s Panegyric {Stutibrähmana-avadäna). In the former, a brahman's daughter sees the Buddha, prasäda arises in her, and she offers the Buddha some barley meal as alms. The Buddha then tells her that as a result of her gift, thirteen eons in the future, she will attain awakening as the Solitary Buddha named Resolute (Supranihita). In the latter, it is a brahman who sees the Buddha and in whom prasäda arises; he, in turn, offers the Buddha a verse of poetry and is told that he will attain awakening as the Solitary Buddha named Praiseworthy (Stavärho) .
What the text emphasizes in these accounts, and in others like them, is that certain objects (e.g., buddhas, images of buddhas, arhats, stüpas), whether directly labeled as such or not, are "agents oí prasäda' {präsädika), and when particular individuals (generally the poor and disenfranchised) come into visual contact with such objects, prasäda arises in them. This experience oí prasäda, in turn, is more than just being filled with faith, properly grateful, or favorably disposed-it also involves a compulsion to give. Offerings initiated by prasäda are objects of little market valuesome barley meal or a stanza of poetry, some rice gruel, a single lamp, or a lump of clay 3 -yet they yield extraordinary results for the donor, such as future awakening. In these accounts the arousal oí prasäda is represented as having less to do with an individual's personal efforts than with the force exerted by präsädika objects; as "agents oí prasäda' it is they, and not the individual, that are the primary cause of the arising oí prasäda, A variation of this scenario occurs in The Story of a Brahman Named Indra {Indrahrähmana-avadäna) and then again in The Story of the Toyikä Festival {Toyikämahä-avadäna) . 4 Though tropes are repeated in the Divyävadäna·, the Toyikä narrative is the only story that occurs twice and the only one that narrativizes and contextualizes the mechanics oí prasäda both for when a buddha is alive and for when no buddha is in living and breathing presence. To summarizeAfter arriving in Toyikä, the Buddha encounters a brahman working in the fields. 5 Not wanting his work to suffer, the brahman, instead of approaching the Buddha, pays his respects to him from where he stands. The Buddha then explains to Änanda that the brahman has missed an opportunity to come and venerate two buddhas, for in the spot where he stands the remains of the Buddha Käsyapa also lie buried. The Buddha then makes the undisturbed body of the Fully Awakened Käsyapa visible so that the monks can cultivate prasäda in their minds, but it soon disappears. In the meantime, King Prasenajit hears that Käsyapa's body is now visible, so he and many hundreds and thousands of others go to Toyikä, only to become dejected when they discover that Käsyapa's body has disappeared. The Buddha confirms for them, however, that if one is "prasäda in mind" {prasannacittah) and performs a variety of practices there-such as circumambulation or the offering of lumps of clay, heaps of pearls, lovely flowers, garlands, oil lamps, perfume, and so onthe result will be a vast treasure of merit. The Buddha then concludes:
One may honor [a buddha] still living as well as one passed into final nirvana. Being equally prasäda in mind there is no difference in merit.
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With regard to the mechanics oí prasäda, what the story demonstrates is that "shrines" {caitya), which the text defines as "places" {pradesa) that have been properly activated, can function as präsädika objects. In this account the presence of these objects is a necessary condition for prasäda to arise and the consequent act of giving to ensue. It is possible that a visual connection is necessary for prasäda to arise in those individuals who make offerings at the Toyikä site, but proximity seems to be the primary cause.
As in the previous examples that involve seeing the Buddha, here too the process oí prasäda at Toyikä is represented as happening rather perfunctorily, almost automatically. One goes to a shrine, prasäda arises, offerings are made (be they lumps of mud or oil lamps), and great rewards are predicted as a result of these deeds. Once again, the efficacy oí prasäda does not rely on previously purifying the mind or cultivating proper intention but, instead, on being in the right place with respect to präsädika objects. But how does all this happen with apparently so little effort, and what does it mean that it does?
THE POWER OF OBJECTS
In his discussion of contemporary ritual practices in a village in North India, Christopher Pinney offers an account of one practice that seems to happen, as it were, automatically. This practice, a six-sentence mantra that invokes Paramhamsji, is advocated by a local resident named C. B. Tiwari. As Pinney explains, The great appeal of the technique-and this is what Tiwari continually stresses-is that faith or belief is not necessary, desires will be fulfilled without belief {bina vishvas). The analogies that tumble forth from Tiwari's lips are all grounded in a technological world in which all that matters is effect: "Suppose that you want to use some electric poweryou make a connection, fit your tube light, lay the wiring, provide a switch, connect this to the overhead wires. If the power is available, the tube is fine, the wiring is fine, the switch is fine, the tube light will come on{chalegal)-with belief or without belief-he flicked his thumb to and fro as though switching the current on and off. To produce surges of electricity in one's own life all that was required was the utterance of six sentences. (1997: 166-167) Although this example of efficacy as electricity describes a verbal utterance and not a moment of visual engagement, the principle involved here well describes the visual logic that governs many of the interactions between practitioner and divine image that Pinney describes elsewhere (2002) . What matters is being "plugged in"-reciting the right mantra or, as seems to be the case in the Toyikä example, being present in the right place and following ritual protocol. When the right conditions are met, the current will flow-be it electricity or prasäda.
The power of objects, both auditory and visual, to affect individuals seemingly automatically is also well attested in Sanskrit literature. In the Bhägavata Puräna it is said that when the women of Vrndävan hear the music of Krsna's flute, their "minds are captivated by Krsna," 7 and regardless of the consequences, they promptly stop whatever they are doingmilking cows, feeding infants, even bathing-and go to him. Though various family members try to stop them, they are compelled by Krsna's flute. They are drawn to him, and only physical force can hold them back. Those women who are restrained are overcome with desire and can only meditate upon him. It is this cathexis that leads directly to their liberation from material reality and karmic bondage.
The listener of the tale, King Pariksit, is baffled and asks how it is that these women, who know Krsna only as a material being, a lover, can attain emancipation from material reality. In response, one commentator, Sndhärasvämin, makes the following point: "The power of a thing does not require [our] understanding [in order for it to be effective]. The drink of immortality achieves its effects when it is drunk even if the drinker thinks otherwise." 8 Krsna's power is not contingent on belief. All one needs is to be directly wired; one does not need to know how the wiring works.
Similar examples of the power of objects also occur in the Mahäbhä-rata, but there the results are more sexual than spiritual and those affected are men, not women. For example, in The Book of the Beginning {Ädi-Parvan) (Sukthankar et al.: 1.120 .1-13), Lord Indra, threatened by the sage Saradvat's austerities, sends the nymph Jälapadi to stop him. When Saradvat sees her, a shudder comes over him, and although he maintains his poise, "his semen flows forth, though he isn't aware of it." 9 In the following chapter , the great seer Bharadvaja sees the nymph Ghrtaci alight, just after she has bathed. The wind blows her skirt away, and he immediately ejaculates. In The Book of the Forest {Äranyaka-Parvan) , a glimpse of the nymph Urvasï has much the same effect on the great seer Käsyapa; he promptly ejaculates, despite his long engagement in ascetic austerities.
In each of these cases, the sight of a divine maiden causes a man to have an orgasm spontaneously, even though each of these men is a religious practitioner engaged in rigorous ascetic discipline involving sexual abstinence. But despite the self-control they have acquired through their austerities, the right image leads them to ejaculate automatically, without their consent or even necessarily their awareness. The text assumes that humans have an "innate, species-wide disposition to respond to particular perceptual stimuli in predetermined ways," what Alfred Gell (44) terms "ethology." It is, as it were, a natural law.
But contrary to what these stories tell us, such visual and visceral interactions are not automatic. The electrical outlet that Tiwari describes has been socially engineered, and built into its construction is a cover plate that masks its origins and full range of functions. Bodily and visual practices, such as those that involve prasäda, have likewise been socially and culturally inscribed.
AUTOMATIC ACTIONS, POLITICS, AND PORNOGRAPHY
One helpful way of thinking about these seemingly automatic actions follows from Pierre Bourdieu's well-known notion of habitus, whose "structuring structures" are said to inscribe in us a belief that many of our learned and conditioned behaviors are actually natural and innate. As Bourdieu observes, "Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness," and such a structure leads to what he terms doxathe experience of "a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization" such that "the natural and social world appears as self-evident" (164). In other words, the conditioned comes to seem unconditioned and natural-not contrived but somehow preordained.
Such a doxic view permeates the Divyävadäna, for it presumes throughout that Buddhist cognitive and causal realities are natural laws, not religious creations. This conception of Buddhist teaching and practice is particularly evident in the Divyävadäna s accounts oí prasäda. Inasmuch as the mechanics oí prasäda abide by the laws of the natural world, the efficacy oí prasäda is not particularly Buddhist in construction but is simply the way the world works. The laws that govern the mechanics oí prasäda are the laws of karma, which in turn are the laws of nature. In the Toyikä narrative it is said that great rewards come to those who visit shrines of the Buddha and make offerings while being "prasäda in mind." Notice that no mention is made of this mental state being directed toward the Buddha. Seeing präsädika objects makes one "prasäda in mind" regardless of one's thoughts, feelings, or intentions. Everyone at Toyikä is equally affected. Receptivity is the default. It would take some rupture or crisis to be otherwise.
In addition to this cognitive leveling of the practitioner's field of activity, the story also features a sociological leveling. While in The Story of a Woman Dependent on a City for Alms {Nagarävalambikä-avadäna) the experience of prasäda is shown to be open to the poor and closed to gods and kings, suggesting a subaltern configuration for prasäda, in the Toyikä narrative the experience is represented as being available and efficacious for the hundreds and thousands of people who make prasäda-mitmted offerings. Presumably these include King Prasenajit, "along with the women of his harem, as well as princes, ministers, military commanders, townspeople, and villagers [sahäntahpurena kumärair amätyair bhatabalägrair naigamajänapadais' ca]" . No sociological study of this representation of the practice is necessary. Individual tastes and habits are elided, as are, apparently, differences in gender, age, race, and class. It is this representation of a sociological leveling, a uniformity of response, that brings to mind Bourdieu's observation that seemingly automatic behavior betrays a social and political agenda (164). Yet how does one get at the politics behind this discourse on prasäda 7 . An instructive analogy can be found in Only Words, Catherine MacKinnon's tract concerning the effects of viewing pornography. Like the Mülasarvästiväda-vinaya, the probable source for the narratives in the Divyävadäna, if not the Divyävadäna itself (cf. Hiraoka), this is a legal text, and its mode of argumentation is similarly didactic. Though MacKinnon's piece relies on logic that at times seems tortuously stretched, its naturalized discourse regarding the power of pornographic objects has striking similarities with the rhetoric in the Divyävadäna regarding the power of präsädika objects. These similarities, in turn, suggest a more political reading for the discourse oí prasäda.
In Only Words MacKinnon claims that consumers of pornography are compelled to live out the pornographic images that they see. These images, she claims, are performatives that men have no choice but to obey, and as such they are not mediated or moderated by intentions or thoughts that men may have. This is not to say that pornography does not contain or engender ideas, but, as MacKinnon explains, "the way it works is not as a thought or through its ideas as such. The message of these materials, and there is one, as there is to all conscious activity, is c get her,' pointing at all women. . . . This message is addressed directly to the penis, delivered through an erection, and taken out on women in the real world. The content of this message is not unique to pornography. It is the function of pornography in effectuating it that is unique" (21-22).
Like others who have claimed that pornography can "provoke gut reactions" (Kuhn: 21) or elicit "'automatic' bodily reactions" (Williams: 5; cf. Mahäbärata citations above), MacKinnon claims that pornography "manipulates the perpetrator's socialized body relatively primitively and directly. ... This is men's beloved c hard-wiring,' giving them that exculpatory sense that the sexual desires so programmed are natural and so operate before and beyond their minds -got there before they did, as it were" (61).
Much like the Toyikä narrative, MacKinnon's work elides differences between subjectivities, such as young and old, gay and straight, by positing that the spectacle of certain objects imposes a uniformity and inevitability of response. Furthermore, these reactions-regardless of whether they are "primitive" or, as in Bourdieu's habitus, learned-produce responses that are seemingly innate and automatic. MacKinnon's belief in the efficacy of pornography is not unlike C. B. Tiwari's belief in the efficacy of the Paramahamsji mantra; both share in the same notion that "faith or belief is not necessary, desires will be fulfilled without belief."
In addition to these similarities between the "hard-wiring" of viewers of pornography as described by MacKinnon and the mechanics of prasäda as depicted in the Divyävadäna, the politics for which MacKinnon marshals her account also has its parallels in the Divyävadäna, As a lawyer committed to the eradication of pornography, MacKinnon is concerned with the legalities that govern the production, dissemination, and consumption of pornographic images. One loophole that she sees in this legislation involves the notion that there is thinking-"mental intermediation," as she terms it-on the part of consumers of pornography when they see pornographic images. Instead, MacKinnon argues that pornography has so habituated and conditioned men in our society that pornographic images now evade these male viewers' critical faculties entirely, neatly bypassing the brain and addressing the penis directly. As MacKinnon explains, "I am not saying that ... [a rapist's] head is not attached to his body; I am saying that his body is attached to his head" (24). Though MacKinnon's argument is ripe for critique-she accounts for differences neither among pornographic images nor among the subject positions of the viewers (cf. Butler)-her concern with the bodily effects of visual practices is a useful heuristic for understanding the politics of the discourse oí prasäda.
It is the concern with the effects of visual objects, be they pornographic or präsädika, that links together the prescriptive accounts in both the Divyävadäna and MacKinnon's work. In both accounts certain images or words are more important for their function than for their content. Such polemics betray an agenda, and in MacKinnon's case it is apparent: Seeing certain images (i.e., pornography) inevitably leads certain individuals (i.e., men) to perform certain actions (i.e., acts of violence against women), and therefore such images should be banned. Likewise in the Buddhist case, seeing or being in the presence of certain images (i.e., präsädika objects) inevitably leads certain individuals (i.e., the poor and perhaps others) to perform certain actions (i.e., acts of giving), and therefore such images should be sought out.
The politics of the discourse of prasäda, then, are the reverse of MacKinnon's. The message is not prohibitive but advocatory: Regardless of your age, gender, or mental faculties (though financial and social standing do seem to matter in some configurations of the discourse), go and see präsädika objects and-as naturally follows-make offerings. The results will be most desirable.
ETHOLOGY, AGENCY, AND ETHICS
Two central ideas seem to be at work in this discourse oí prasäda. First, when particular individuals see präsädika objects, they become possessed oí prasäda. Unlike the Pali materials, the Divyävadäna portrays the arising of this mental state as having less to do with the personal natures and predispositions of individuals than with the impersonal functioning and effects of conditioned existence.
10 Second, as it is made clear elsewhere in the Divyävadäna, regardless of such individuals' desires, the mental state oí prasäda seems to lead, invariably, to particular results-most often to an act of giving, which in turn yields beneficial results in the future, and occasionally directly to an auspicious rebirth. As it is explained in The Story of an Upstart {Sahasodgata-avadäna), being possessed oí prasäda involves "doing the duty of one who has prasäda' {prasannädhikäram + y kr; Cowell and Neil: 305.5-9, 308.13-309.1), and the text is explicit that this "duty" {adhikära) is an almost compulsive need to make an offering.
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In short, the agency that motivates the mechanics of prasäda, whether this process involves a visual engagement or a physical one, seems to inhere as much in the object of engagement as in the subject. It is precisely this outside agency of prasäda that makes prasäda-initiated giving so effective. Within the rigid fatalism of cause and effect that is so conspicuous in the Divyävadäna, only an outside force can generate a karmic intrusion that will allow one to escape from one's karmic destiny. This is not to say that the subject is simply a cipher that is only acted on but that the process oí prasäda is represented as being so naturalized as to happen effortlessly and, it seems, regardless of a range of distinctions among particular subjectivities. This mechanism underlying prasäda is unquestioned in the text; objects can elicit automatic responses. What is presented in the Divyävadäna is that prasäda can arise in this way and from these particular objects.
But now consider this vision of Buddhist ethics: Instead of the burden being placed on the individual to cultivate right thoughts and to perform proper actions, as is generally thought to be the case in Buddhist ethics (cf. Saddhatissa: 87-112), here individuals are represented as being able to proceed from seeing to giving and then on to a reward in the future with a bare minimum of personal effort and proper mental condi-10 This notion of individuals being moved by an agency outside themselves is particularly apparent in the case of the guildmaster's son in The Story ofMandhäta (Mandhäta-avadäna) . When he sees the Fully Awakened Sarväbhibhü, "intense prasäda arises in him" (atïva prasäda utpannah; Cowell and Neil: 226.27 ). This is then glossed by saying that "he is one whose mind has been made to be possessed of prasäda " (prasädtkrtacetä; Cowell and Neil: 226.28) . Although no agent is specified, it seems that the inspiration of prasäda is caused not by the efforts of the guildmaster's son but by the power of the Fully Awakened Sarväbhibhü's visage. 11 The sense oí adhikära here is difficult to capture with a single-word translation in English. It is one's duty, one's obligation or prerogative, what one simply does, but yet it has a sense neither of coercion nor of being something that one could easily refuse to do. It is a duty, an impetus, and a compulsion but also a privilege. David Eckel and David Seyfort Ruegg suggest the French métier (personal communication).
tioning.
12 It is sufficient merely to enter the presence of a präsädika object, see it, and then make an offering. This is not to say, though, that one no longer needs to follow the Eightfold Path, for the benefits of the practice of prasäda are limited. In The Story of One Foretold to Be a Cakravartin King {Cakravartivyakrta-avadäna), it is said that monks can also engage in this practice, but for them the results may not be desirable. When the Buddha points to one monk and explains that as a result of experiencing prasäda he will enjoy many millions of reigns as a cakravartin king, the other monks balk at spending so much time stuck in conditioned existence and give up the practice altogether. Although the experience of prasäda may be beneficial for lay people, these monks want a faster method to escape conditioned existence. For this end, "engaging in meditation, study, yoga, and contemplation' 513 proves more effective (Cowell and Neil: 344.18). Apparently monks, unlike the laity, can control their responses to präsädika objects, cultivating prasäda or not as they choose.
Nevertheless, this mechanism oí prasäda affects the very fundamentals of Buddhist ethics. For example, from the very outset of the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dharmapada, as well as the Pali Dhammapada, it is explained that an individual's mental state when performing an action is of paramount importance in determining his or her resultant condition. But from the perspective of the Divyävadäna, the first two verses of the Dharmapada, if not those of the Dhammapada, are a call not to meditate or to do good deeds for a neighbor but to go and see an object that causes prasäda and then make an offering. As they exhort, If, with a polluted mind, one speaks or acts, then suffering follows as a wheel the draught ox's foot ... If, with a mind possessed oí prasäda, one speaks or acts, then happiness follows as a shadow that never departs. 14 Perhaps, then, in the early centuries of the Common Era these verses were intended as a call to go on pilgrimage to where präsädika objects could be found so that one's mind could be transformed from one that is "polluted" {pradusta) into one "possessed of prasäda" {prasanna). Then happiness would follow, not to mention great karmic rewards in the future. With the establishment of many new monasteries in the first centu-12 Generally, the exercise of such personal agency is crucial in determining the value of an individual's actions. For example, a monk's intention while performing an act that transgresses monastic law is important in determining the degree of his culpability (Harvey) . 13 The original text reads: dhyänädhyayanayogamanasikärayuktä (Cowell and Neil: 344.18 ries of the Common Era, most of them situated just outside of urban centers along trade routes and hence easily accessible (Heitzman) , there very well may have been a concerted effort among the monastic community to encourage pilgrimage (as well as donations) to these sites. This certainly seems to be the point of the Toyikä narrative, and the same message is made even more explicitly in The Story ofKunäla {Kunäla-avadäna), which narrates King Asoka's pilgrimage to sites associated with the Buddha and his chief disciples as well as the offerings that he made there. In The Story of Kotikarna {Kotikarna-avadäna) the venerable Mahäkätyäyana explains that "Fully Awakened Tathägata Arhats are certainly to be seen and certainly to be served." 15 The same is apparently true for other präsädika objects as well. This seemingly automatic connection between seeing präsädika objects and serving them with offerings raises additional ethical issues. The mechanism of prasäda implies not an intention to give but a compulsion to give, and it is unclear whether the donor consciously recognizes this compulsion or not. The donor need not feel some personal desire or inclination to make an offering but only an external impetus to do so-such is the compulsion of prasäda, Arjun Appadurai's work on praise and emotion in Hindu India offers insight into some possible implications of this formulation. He describes an instance of "coercive subordination" in which beggars bless and praise their (potential) benefactors "to trap them in the cultural implications of their roles as superiors, that is, in the obligation to be generous" (101). 16 Here Buddhist orthopraxy seems to be doing much the same; it traps individuals into giving. It provides the naturalized and necessary logic for what Bourdieu refers to as "bodily hexis."
17 Individuals who come and see prasäda-generating objects are compelled to make offerings. Not doing so would be tantamount to admitting that prasäda has not arisen in one. And if prasäda has not arisen in one, then presumably one has not accrued the vast amounts of merit such objects are capable of generating. This would be the rupture and crisis that I men-15 The original text reads: drastavyä èva paryupäsitavyä èva hi tathägata arhantäh samyaksambuddhäh (Cowell and Neil: 19.4-5)! 16 Judith T. Irvine makes a similar point in her work on the "affective registers" of the speaking styles of two Wolof castes-the nobles and griots. As she explains, "Extravagantly praising an addressee supposedly 'strengthens' the addressee and moves him or her to praiseworthy acts (such as distributing largesse). The audience, too, is moved and persuaded of the respectability of the person being praised" (154). Likewise, this social logic leads to a form of entrapment: "Whether or not you 'really feeP the particular emotion you display, your subjective experience presumably includes knowing that you should sound like a griot (about whose emotionality you have certain beliefs). Your attitude toward griots, and toward being for the moment associated with them, must color your feelings toward other aspects of the situation" (Irvine: 156).
17 As Bourdieu explains, "Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking* (93-94). tioned previously, for among the laity, it is only the deviant who manage to get prasäda wrong.
AESTHETICS, EROTICS, AND FUNCTION
This deviancy, however, is revealing; it helps to explain the aesthetics of the experience oí prasäda and the consequences of the elision of "mental intermediation," as MacKinnon calls it. When one gets prasäda wrong, the problem is not that one has deliberated and consciously made a choice that is somehow mistaken. The problem is that one has a faulty disposition, a faulty nature-or, to follow Tiwari and MacKinnon's metaphor, faulty wiring. As a result of this fault, seeing a präsädika object results not in the state oí prasäda and the making of a prasäda-initiated offering but in a libidinal pleasure and a consequent urge to give. This bifurcation of results highlights an overlap between präsädika objects as those things that are ritually effective and those things that are "attractive," as in the frequently occurring string of epithets-"handsome, good-looking, and attractive."
18 In both cases, an individual sees the Buddha or one of his disciples and is aroused to give, but offerings that arise from a libidinal impulse are rejected.
In The Story of Mäkandika {Mäkandika-avadäna), for example, a wandering mendicant named Mäkandika and his wife Säkali give birth to an incomparably beautiful daughter who is appropriately named Anupamä (Incomparable). When she grows up, her father decides to choose a husband for her based on this criterion: "I won't give this girl to anyone because of his high standing, nor because of his wealth or even his learning. Instead, I'll give her to whoever is as beautiful or more beautiful than she is."
19 One day, Mäkandika happens to see the Buddha, "and at the sight of him, he is pleased and delighted." 20 He then reflects, "Such an ascetic as this one is präsädika, is very good looking, and captivates everyone. Indeed, for every woman it is difficult to find a suitable husband, but how much more so in the case of Anupamä. I have found a son-in-law!" 21 Thereafter Mäkandika informs his wife of his decision, and the two of them 18 The original text reads: abhirüpo darianlyah präsädikah (Cowell and Neil: 2.26, 11.1-2, 26.2-3, 58.2, etc.).
19 The original text reads: iyam därikä na maya kasyacit kulena dätavyä na dhanena näpi srutena kimtu yo c syä rüpena samo väpy adhika vä tasya mayä dätavyeti (Cowell and Neil: 515.23-25). 20 The original text reads: drstvä capunah pritiprämodyajätah (Cowell and Neil: 516.14). 21 The original text reads: yädrio 'yam sramanah präsädikah pradarianïyah sakalajanamanohärt durlabhas tu sarvastrtjanasya patih pratirüpah präg evänupamäyä labdho mejämäteti (Cowell and Neil: 516.14-17). The corresponding Tibetan reads: "He is fit to be the lord of all of Jambudvïpa, not to mention Anupamä Ydzam bu'i gling mtha' daggi bdag bor 'os pa yin na dpe med ma'i bdag por Ita smos kyad ci dgos te]" (Derge Kanjur, vol. nya, 17lai).
go to see the Buddha. When they catch sight of him, Mäkandika's wife recognizes that the Buddha is a "great seer" {maharsih) and realizes her mistake. "He won't accept a girl as a devotee," she concludes. "Turn back. Let's go home."
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Disregarding his wife's assessment of the situation, Mäkandika nevertheless has their daughter Anupamä adorned so that she maybe presented to the Buddha as a bride. Mäkandika's wife protests, and five times she concludes, "This husband won't accept a girl. Turn back. Let's go home. 23 Eventually, Mäkandika does offer his daughter's hand in marriage to the Buddha, and the Buddha destroys any such aspirations she might have had with what he himself regards as "hateful words" {pratighavacana):
Brahman, at the sight of this very daughter of Mara, I [feel] neither craving nor affection. Since I take no enjoyment in sense pleasures, I have no interest in touching her, even if she has been given to me, for she is filled with piss and shit.
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This account contains an odd mixture of sexualized and devotional discourse. At the sight of the Buddha, Mäkandika is not filled with prasäda but is instead "pleased and delighted" and eager to offer the Buddha his daughter in marriage. Mäkandika recognizes no impropriety in this deed, for within the domestic sphere a "gift of a maiden" {kanyädäna) is an appropriate offering (cf. . In this case, however, his arousal to give is in error. It arises not from prasäda but from libidinal desire. This is apparent when Mäkandika first offers his daughter to the Buddha. He remarks, 22 The original text reads: näsau bhaktäm bhajate kumärikäm nivarta yäsyämah svakam niveéanam . 23 The original text reads: näsau bhartä bhajate kumärikäm nivarta yäyämah svam niveéanam (Cowell and Neil: 517.11, . Note, read na esa instead of näsau. 24 The original text reads: drstä maya märasutä hi vipra trsnä na [me] näpi tathä ratis ca / chando na me kämagunesu kaácit tasmäd imam mütrapurisapürnäm // <sprastum hi dattäm> api notsaheyam (Cowell and Neil: 519.14-18). Note, Cowell and Neil add me, though it is omitted in all of the manuscripts. E. J. Thomas suggests: "drstä mayä märasutä hi vipra trsnä räga cäpi tathä aratis ca" (654)-that is, O brahman, I have seen Mära's daughters-Trsnä (Craving), Räga (Passion), and Arati (Affection). This reading, Thomas notes, "corresponds May the Blessed One look here at this virtuous daughter of mine, she is beautiful, enchanting, ornamented, and lustful. I offer her to you, and with her you should behave like a man of virtue, just as the moon in the company of [his consort] Rohinï in the sky.
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Although Mäkandika addresses the Buddha as "Blessed One," seemingly acknowledging the Buddha's status as an eminent ascetic, he is apparently not aware that the Buddha is celibate, for he then tells him to accept his daughter and behave with her "like a man of virtue."
26 Following the analogy to the moon and his wife Rohinï, he should behave like a good husband. But Mäkandika's focus on beauty as the sole determining factor for marriage contravenes Brahmanical injunctions as well (cf. . His response to the Buddha's beauty is multiply mistaken. He is both miswired and misguided.
By contrast, Mäkandika's own wife recognizes the Buddha as a great seer, not a future son-in-law. Yet she seems to be confused about what offering should be made. First she complains that the Buddha will not accept their daughter as a devotee, as though they were offering their daughter to the Buddha as the prized gift of a new disciple. 27 As it is said in The Story of One Protected by the Community {Sangharaksita-avadäna), "There is no better gift for a Tathägata than a gift of a new disciple."
28 But then Mäkandika's wife complains that the Buddha will not accept their daughter as a wife. Though the Buddha is many things to many people-a great 25 The original text reads: imäm bhagavän paáyatu me sutäm satäm satïm / rüpopapannäm pramadäm alamkrtäm / kämärthimm yad bhavate pradïyate / sahänayä sädhur iväcaratäm bhavän / sametya candro nabhasïva rohinïm . Note, for line 1, to preserve the meter, Thomas suggests imäm bhavän paiyatu me sutäm satïm (655)-that is, "look at this virtuous daughter of mine." Thomas emends bhagavän to bhavän because "a brahmin, it is well known, does not address the Lord as such, but as bhavän" (655). For the peculiar term satäm, Cowell and Neil query satyäm (519n4). For line 3, J. S. Speyer suggests rüpopapannä pramadä alamkrtä kämärthim yad bhavate pradïyate (359). For line 4, Speyer suggests sahänayä sädhu cared ratim bhavän (359). Also possible is sahänayä sädhur iväcared bhavän. For the Tibetan, see Derge Kanjur, vol. nya, 172a7. 26 While the Buddha is referred to as an "ascetic" (sramana), Mäkandika is described as a "wandering mendicant" {parivräjaka) y a term that here seems to denote a wayward form of renunciant. Likewise, in The Miracle Sütra (Prätihärya-sütra), the various "heretics" (tïrthika) who attempt to defeat the Buddha in a competition of magical powers are referred to as "mendicant heretics" {tïrthikaparivrajaka; Cowell and Neil: 146.19 ).
Adding to the confusion of sexualized and devotional discourse here is the ambiguity of the expression "like a man of virtue." It can also mean "like a saint"-more pointedly, like someone who is celibate. Speyer may be right, though, in concluding that this is "another instance of the hortative particle sädhu, not being understood by copyists and leading them into error" (359). 27 In the corresponding Tibetan, however, Mäkandika's wife concludes that "this husband won't accept a girl" (Derge Kanjur, vol. nya y 171a4), just as she does in the five times that follow. seer, a teacher, a victor, and so on-he is a husband or a bridegroom to no one. In both cases, Mäkandika's wife refers to their daughter as a "girl" {kumärika), an affectionate, diminutive, and even desexualizing term that in the voice of a mother might even be translated as "sweet little girl." Mäkandika's wife, unlike her husband, appears to be wary of treating their daughter as a sexualized commodity.
As for the Buddha, he speaks "hateful words" to Mäkandika's daughter to demonstrate his detachment from sense pleasures and to try to cultivate the same in her. Whereas Mäkandika was swayed by the beauty of the Buddha, the Buddha explains that he is not swayed by the sight of Mäkandika's daughter. He has a different nature, and this yields a different response.
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This story, with its paired motifs of prasäda and its perversion, is reminiscent of an episode from Maxim Gorky's childhood when he inappropriately kissed a miracle-working image of the virgin. As Gorky notes, She'll probably cause my arms to wither for carrying her with dirty hands. I loved the Virgin ... and when the time came to kiss her, I tremblingly pressed my lips to her mouth, not noticing how the grownups did it. Someone's strong arm hurled me into the corner by the door.... You simpleton! said my master in a mild rebuke For several days I waited like one condemned. First I had grasped the Virgin with dirty hands, then I had kissed her in the wrong way But apparently the Virgin forgave my involuntary sin. (in Freedberg: 320) "He behaved to her," David Freedberg notes, "impetuously and immaturely-as if she were some mortal woman, of the kind he knew, and not as some divine unknowable being. To her and not to it. Gorky's sin consisted in acting spontaneously on that basis" (320). Yet the sin, as Gorky notes, was "involuntary." Considering that the Virgin was "the most beautiful of all women on earth," Gorky's mistake was understandable. Never- 29 The Buddha makes this clear in his response to Mäkandika: "As one deluded desires senseobjects, / he may, O brahman, long for your daughter, / as she is beautiful and attached to senseobjects. / In this respect a man not free from attachment is quite deluded. // But I am a Buddha, best of sages, active [and engaged] / who has obtained supreme auspicious awakening. / As a lotus is undefiled by a drop of water, /1 walk in the world also undefiled. // And as a blue lotus in muddy water / is certainly not defiled by mud, / in just this way, O brahman, in the world, /1 remain separate from sense-pleasures." The original text reads: yasmäd iharthï visayesu müdhah sa prärthayed vipra sutäm tavemäm / rüpopapannäm visyesu <saktäm> avitarägo 'tra janah pramüdhah // aham tu buddho munisattamah krtï präptä mayä bodhir anuttarä sivä / padmam yathä värikanair aliptam carämi loke 'nupalipta eva // nïlambujam kardamavärimadhye yathä <na> pankena vanopaliptam / tathä hy aham brähmana lokamadhye carämi kämesu vivikta]" (Divy: 519.25-520.7). Note, I follow the queries of Cowell and Neil and read saktäm (519η 10) for saktäm (519.27) and na (520n2) for ca (520.4). theless, his confusion between spiritual love and erotic love merited a strong-armed response.
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Gorky's response to the Virgin is not unlike Mäkandika's response to the Buddha. Though the object is supposed to inspire prasäda and not erotic desire, the power and beauty of the object can stimulate an improper, libidinal response. To use Lyotard's language, it is as though one engages with such objects primarily in the figurai realm-that realm in which "meaning is not produced and communicated, but intensities are felt" (Carrol: 31). Yet these intensities are then registered and responded to in a discursive realm, and this happens as though by default, without any conscious decision making.
As a result of this lack of "mental intermediation," these different responses to präsädika objects involve an immediate and tactile grasping and, hence, a sensory and corporeal aesthetics. While a libidinal response to a präsädika object entails an explicit erotics, the canonically correct response of ritual giving involves a more subtle erotics. The immediacy of the arising of prasäda, the result of this lack of mental intermediation, generates an erotic quality.
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In discussing visual practices in postcolonial India, Christopher Pinney makes much the same claim. As Pinney writes, "Within film, chromolithography and studio photography one can trace parallel movements which involved the abolition of the space of contemplation and the intensification of erotic tactility.... Contemplation-which was promulgated in India through colonial Arts Schools from the mid 1850s onward-might be seen as concerned with 'hermeneutics' in Sontag's terms, its abolition allowing the emergence of a new "erotics '" (2002: 361 ) .
32 It is this "new" erotics, this interested aesthetics, as opposed to Kant's disinterested variety, that Pinney terms "corpothetics."
Once again, a comparison with pornography is instructive, for there seems to be a similar aesthetics-or corpothetics-involved in visually 30 A famous example of this confusion is Gianlorenzo Bernini's statue of Saint Teresa. She is clearly aroused, though it is unclear whether that arousal is a divine ecstasy or something more mundane.
31 These erotic associations of prasäda are also found in its modern Hindi usage. For example, Hardev Bahri's Rajpal English-Hindi Dictionary contains the following entry: "buxom bak sam a. (of a woman) gay, frolicsome prasannacitt, moti evam akarsak" Here the physical attributes of a woman's sexuality are defined not as generating "prasäda of mind" (prasannacit) but as being "prasäda of mind," eliding the difference between the object and the state that it engenders as well as any notion of mental intermediation. Being buxom is also akin to being "plump" ( moti) and "attractive" (äkarsak). Like präsädika objects, it draws things in; it is the agent of action.
32 As Susan Sontag writes, "Ideally, it is possible to elude interpreters in another way, by making works of art whose surface is so unified and clean, whose momentum is so rapid, whose address is so direct that the work can be . . . just what it is. Is this possible now? It does happen in films, I believe" (11).
engaging with präsädika objects and watching certain enunciative spectacles in pornographic films. And what is crucial about this analogy is the similarity of function of these two phenomena.
In her discussion of stag films Linda Williams distinguishes between the narratives of such films and the extranarrative enunciative spectacles that occur "when the bodies within the frame come so close that their means of relation is no longer looking but touching" {71), Explaining the tactile effect of such images, she writes, "It is, in short, as if the spectacle of the naked or nearly naked body... retards any possible forward narrative drive. It seems in effect to be saying, 'Let's just feast our eyes and arrest our gaze on the hidden things that ordinary vision ... cannot see ... who needs more?" (71). It is these images, she claims, that "seek to move us" (285).
If Williams is right, part of the power of pornographic films is that the intended function is effected not through the narratives of the films but through such extranarrative spectacles. According to Williams, this distinction between "narrative" and "number," between story and tableau, is a common trait of both pornographic films and movie musicals (130-134). But as is clear from Williams's account-and this is crucialnarration can be an impediment to the function. The central function of pornographic films is arousal, and this is effected through their spectacles, not their stories.
33 In Lyotard's terminology, it is not a discursive process but a figurai one.
THE FUNCTION OF AVADÄNAS
All this raises some intriguing possibilities about the function of avadänas. Although scholars have claimed that avadänaswere used to popularize Buddhism (Dutt 1930: 20) , to inspire the laity (Weeraratne: 397) , to educate the common people (Sharma: 19) , to instruct young monks (Vaidya: xii) , and to offer preliminary teachings (Tatelman: 12) , the aesthetics oí prasäda suggest an additional possibility.
The viewer oí präsädika objects and the viewer of pornographic spectacles both view images whose function is less to communicate than to arouse, and this function is effected naturally, effortlessly, and automati-33 Philip Lutgendorf makes a similar point in describing the tendency of the televised Sägar Rämäyan "to periodically halt the flow of its narrative to focus on stylized, posterlike tableaux, accompanied by devotional singing," which functioned "as a visual distillation for the contemplation of devotees" (230-231). According to Lutgendorf, contemplating this visual distillation led many viewers to experience bhakti-another term that is frequently, though not unproblematically, translated as "faith." In the Divyävadäna^ by contrast, bhakti is depicted as a false belief in unseen divine forces to intervene in human affairs (e.g., 3).
cally-or so it seems. But the listener of avadänas (or, more recently, the reader) is also confronted with similar extranarrative enunciative spectacles that "retard any possible forward narrative drive." This happens, for example, during prasäda episodes, wherein characters in the story and outside listeners alike experience a narrative pause. Occasionally these excursuses from the narrative are also extended, such as when they contain stereotyped descriptions of the Buddha's physical form.
In the Toyikä narrative, for example, when the brahman working in the fields first sees the Buddha, his vision is accompanied by a stereotyped description of the Buddha's wondrous physical form. He sees the Buddha, who is adorned with the thirty-two marks of a great man, whose body is radiant with the eighty minor marks, who is adorned with a halo extending an arm's length, whose brilliance is greater than a thousand suns, and who like a mountain of jewels that moves, is beautiful from every side.
34
The brahman does not develop prasäda, however, for as the Buddha explains, the brahman was too far away to venerate him. This stereotyped description, occurring immediately after a character sees the Buddha and immediately before prasäda arises, functions as a kind of description of the content of the prasäda experience. Put another way, this description is a discursive reading of a figurai encounter-a moment, as it were, of the sublime put into words.
Such extranarrative interruptions also occur outside of the discourse of prasäda. Most notably, there are various stock descriptions of the powers and attributes of buddhas 35 and a stereotyped description of the qualities of arhats. 36 Many of these descriptions occur frequently and as such are often abbreviated with a cursory "and so on as before" {pürvavad yävat), 37 The most common of these stereotypical descriptions is a ten- 34 The original text reads: dvätrimaatä mahäpurusalaksanaih samalamkrtam aaïtya cänuvyanjanair viräjitagätram vyämaprabhälamkrtam süryasahasrätirekaprabham jangamam iva ratnaparvatam samantato bhadrakam . 35 For example, "Now the Blessed One was self-controlled, and his followers were self-controlled [atha bhagavän dänto däntaparivärah] ..." etc.) . 36 For example, "He was free from attachment in the Three Realms [of desire, form, and formlessness] [traidhätukavttarägah] . . ." etc.) . 37 Such elisions occur for the above description of the Buddha (Cowell and Neil: 96.16-18) as well as for the description of arhats (Cowell and Neil: 18.26, 341.1, 342.6, 344.24, etc.) .
fold list of characteristics applied to the Buddha. Generally, after an introduction explaining that in the past there arose in the world a particular Buddha, this list occurs as an enumeration of his attributes.
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But this list also occurs in another stereotyped passage, immediately after it is said that "the Blessed One is just like this-."
39 And in The Story of One Foretold to Be a Cakravartin King this list of epithets is shown to be not the content of the prasäda experience, as the previously mentioned list seems to have been, but the content of the meditative practice known as buddhänusmrti ("Bringing to Mind the Buddha"). This is also stated more explicitly in the Pali materials. 40 And so, my point: since some of these stereotyped descriptions function explicitly as objects of contemplation outside of the larger narratives in which they are embedded, perhaps others of these stereotyped descriptions-all of which, it should be noted, describe präsädika objects-also function as extranarrative enunciative spectacles. Such "image-texts" (Mitchell: 89) , which combine the power of icon and word, may resist discursive readings, but they are not extraneous to the message of their stories. Perhaps, in some sense, they are the message itself.
My sense is that there are different but complementary functions in the narrative and extranarrative components of these stories. The former is more legalistic, didactic, and discursive, and the latter is more impressionistic, contemplative, and figurai. More loosely, the former seeks to teach us, and the latter, like the pornographic image, "seeks to move us." CODA The Divyävadäna postulates that there is a class of objects whose sight leads to the rise oí prasäda in the viewer and that this mental state leads the viewer to make an offering. Yet there is no indication that when an individual sees a präsädika object and then prasäda arises in him or her, the individual is conscious that prasäda has arisen. Prasäda may lead one 38 The Blessed One, it is said, "is a Tathägata, an arhat, a Fully Awakened being, perfect in knowledge and action, a Sugata, a knower of the world, an unsurpassed guide for those in need of training, a teacher of gods and mortals, a Buddha, and a Blessed One [tathägato 'rhan samyaksambuddho vidyäcaranasampannah sugato lokavid anuttarah purusadamyasärathih iästä devamanuiyänäm buddho bhagavän]" see 347.1, 464.15, etc) . In some of these instances, the first three of these epithets-Tathägata, arhat, Fully Awakened being-are skipped. For more on this list of epithets of the Buddha, see . 39 The original text reads: ity api sa bhagaväms . . . . 40 On the connection in the Pali materials between the practice of buddhänusmrti and the iti pi so verse, a corresponding list of epithets minus the term tathägatha, see the Visuddhimagga vii.2-67 trans, , and Hallisey, to make an offering, but it does not lead one to a self-conscious awareness of its presence. Though prasäda can be postulated as the mental state possessed by one who has seen a präsädika object and then made an offering to it, the immediacy of the experience oí prasäda seems to preclude a self-consciousness of the experience oí prasäda itself. The experience of prasäda is direct and affective; it is not mediated by conscious decision making or reflection. Hence, one's success or failure to respond properly to präsädika objects is a manifestation of one's nature and disposition. It is, as it were, a question of one's wiring, or so these narratives would have us believe.
In addition to offering preliminary insight into the intricacies of Buddhist moral psychology, this discourse of prasäda also has important implications for our understanding of Indian Buddhist practice. The discursive message of the stories in the Divyävadäna is that one should go and see präsädika objects, be aroused by them, and make offerings. This injunction may have helped to justify the proliferation of the most conspicuous oí präsädika objects-the Buddha image-that occurred during the early centuries of the Common Era. Likewise, listening to these stories, with their extranarrative stereotyped descriptions of the Buddha, may have caused a similar form of arousal in the devotee, perhaps with similar results.
It is telling that one would make offerings at Buddhist sites, or perhaps upon listening to Buddhist stories, as an unselfconscious reflex. For an individual to see a präsädika object and not make an offering is an admission that prasäda has not arisen, that one is miswired, trained in the wrong habitus, or even worse, aroused erotically, not ritually. Hence, the aesthetics of the experience oí prasäda can have political significance. All this raises additional questions about the sociology of practice at Buddhist shrines. The so-called narrative art at these shrines does seem to offer some explanations, but a detailed discussion of these materials is a topic for another article. Clearly, there is no shortage of questions.
